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In the Supren1e Court of the
State of Utah

DELBERT M. YERGENSE.N,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

)
I

vs.

\

EMMETT D. FORlD, ·and N. E. FERGUSON,

CASE
NO. 10198

dba FORD AND FERGUSON,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE

·Respondent adopts appellant's statement.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

Respondent adopts appellant's statement.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent adopts appellant's statement.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellant's statement of facts is substantially correct.
Respondent would add, ·however, that the recoro indicates
service of process oniy upon defendant Emmett D. Ford,
and the entire action, including this appeal, pertains only
to this defendant personally.
Respondent would also add that the compromise agreement entered into on April 18, 1950, (Tr. 4-6) was an agreement by defendant Emmett D·. Ford to pay ornly a portion
of the judgment, and that the origilnal judgment was entered on September 7, 1949.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I

AN ACTION BASED ON A PRIOR JUDGMENT,
WinCH IS COMMENCED MOIRE THAN EIGHT (8)
~EARS AFTER ENTRY Q;F THE PRIOR JUDGlY.IENT,
IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
POINT

n

THE STATUTE O·F LIMITATIONS AS IT PERTAINS TO· AN ACTION BASED ON A PRIOR JUDGMENT, IS NOT T01LLED BY AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT
OF, Q~R PAYMENTS O·N, SAID JUDGMENT.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AN ACTIOIN BASED ON A PRIOR JUDGMENT,
WinCH IS CO'l\fl\1ENCEID MORE THAN EIGIIT (8)
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3
YEARS AFTER ENTRY O~F THE PRI,O·R JUDGME:NT,
IS BARRED BY THE S~ATUTE O·F LIMITATIO·NS.

".Dhe present action, to renew a judgment was commenced on February 5, 1958. This was almost 8 yeaifls
and 5 months from the date of entry of the original judgment (September 7, 1949). The pertinent Utah Statute
is as folllows:
78-12-22 "Within eight years: an action upon a judgment or decree of any Court otf the United States or of
any state or territory within the United States."
The conclusiveness of this statute is supplemented by
other statutory provisions.
Ru1e 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, proiVides in
part as follows:
"(a) Process to enforce a judgment shall be by a writ
of execution unless the court otherwise directs, which
may issue at any tim·e within eight years after the
entry of judgment .
''
(Emphasis ours.)
Title 78-22-1, Urtah Oode Annotated, 1953, referring
to judgment liens again~st real property, concludes as follows:

"The lien shall continue for eight years unless the judg. ment is previously satisfied oro unless the enforcement
of the judgment is stayed on appeal lby the execution
of a sufficient undertaking as provided by law, in
which case the lien of the judgment ·ceases.''
(Emphasis ours)

Also, in Youngdale v. Burton, 102 Utah 169, 128 P2d
1053, a case somewhat similar to the case at bar, the issue
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before the court was whether a writ of -execution, based
on a prior judgment could issue after the expiration of
eight years ~rom entry of the judgment. The court said:
"A money judgment :f1orn1s the basis for but two legal
proceedings.: (a) A suit thereon, brought within eight
years, wherein it forms the basis or chose in action
for a new judgment, or (b) Some form of proceedings in execution for collection. Subdivision (a) is
disposed o[ by Section 104-2-21, the eight-year statute
O.L~ l"Ull.l"ta t"lOtn.S. ,

POINT II

THE ,STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS IT PERTAINS TO AN ACTION BASED ON A PRIOR JUDGMENT, IS NOT TOLLBD BY AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT
OF, O~R PAYMENTS O·N, SAID JUDGMENT.
.Appellant contends that an acknowledgment of, or
payment on a _prior. judgment, should have the effect of
tolling the statute of limitations, so that a new action,
based on the judgment, might properly be filed within
eight . years . &fter ~uch acknowledgment or payment. In
this ~connection, appellant cites Title 78-1244, Utah Code
Annotated, 19·53-, which provides that in a case founded
on .ccnt:ract, the statute of limitations may be tolled by
payment or acknowledgment, and urges that a "judgment"
is a "contract" and the·refore subject to the provisions of
this statute.
With ·respect to the applioobility of a statute of this
kind to judgments, the following language points out the
general problem and its solution in the courts of various

states:
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"With respect to judgments, in each instance the decisions seem to turn upon the determination of the
question whether the obligation is a contract. Thus,
in some jurisdictions, on the theocy that a judgment
is a contract, it is held that a part payment on a judgment has the same effect to interrupt the running of
the statute as it does in the case of other contractual
obligations. In other jurisdictions, it is held that a
judgment is not a contract within the meaning of
limitations statutes and that an action thereon is not
ex 10ontractu. Decisions, therefore, which adhere to
this doctrine hold that a part-payment of a judgment
does nort: remo~e the bar of the statute or mise a new
promise, such as will start it running anew. In these
jurisdictions, it is held that a cause of action becomes
merged in the judgment rendered in an action to recover thereon, and upon the entry of the judgment,
becomes -changed in form and its original character
wholly extinguished." (34 Am. Jur., Limitation of
A;ctions, p. 264, Sec. 335)
1

Since the statutes involved seem to be the controlling
factor, an analysis of the pertinent Utah statutes should
be hetpful:

The Utah statute referred to herein (78-12-44) was
originally enacted in 1872. It has not been changed Ol'
amended sin:ce its original passage. This section was taken
verbatim from K·ansas, it being originally enacted by that
8tate as Kansas General Statutes, 1868, Page 634, Section
24 (O'Donnell v. Parker, 160 Pac. 1192, Utah). This statute
has likewise never been changed or amended by the Srtate
of Kansas since its original enactment.
It is significant to note that Kansas is among those
states in whi~ch it has been held that an acknowledgment
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of a judgment or a partial payment theTeon does not operate to start the statute running anew from the time of

the acknowledgment or payment. (Harper v. Daniels,
1914,_ CA 8th Kan., 211 Fed. 57; Sharp v. Sharp 1941, 154
K;an. 175, 117 P2d 561). In the case of Sharp v. Sharp,
Supra, the Kansas. Court ve~ry carefully analyzes a statute
identical to our Title 78-12-44, for the purpose of determining whether a judgment can be interpreted as being
a "contract" within the meaning of that sta·tute. The
Court concluded that a judgment \Vas nort a contract within the meaning. of that statute, and held that part payment
made on a prior judgment did nort' toll the statute of limitations on a subsequent suit based on that prior judgment.
Our present Section 78:..12-44 is the result of the repeal
of. the f,ormer section and. the passing of a new statute in
1951. The newly enacted statute was identical with the
fiormer one. Had there been any legislative intent to ex-

tend the period of limitation on a judgment by the mak1ng of part payments, or by the written acknowledgment
of the debt, or ·by court authority, such intent would have
been voiced hy the legislature at that time. The fact that
the legislature, has been silent on tllis question since the
original enactment of this statute in 1872 would appear
to indicate an intention on the part of the legislature that
the- word "-contract" in the statute not be interpreted to
mean "judgment".
Such an implication of legislative intent was reached
by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in La Salle Extension
University v. Barr (1941) 19· NJ Misc. 387, 20 A2d 609.
In that case, an action was filed· based on a prior judgment.
The statute of limitations in New Jersey for such actions
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is 20 years, and the case was filed more t!han 20 years

after the original judgment had been entered. In reviewing the statute the court says:
"In New Jersey on the other hand, the statute makes

no provision that payment or acknorwledgement of an
indebtedness within 20 years shall be exception to the
presumption of payment after 20 years.
The fact\~that the New Jersey statute by implication seems to say exactly the opposite"Q>y nort mentioning any means by which the limitations on a judgment might be tolled in a statutory section following
immediately upon one providing that the statute running upon certain contracts might be tolled by payment made thereon within the period of limitation.)
As stated by appellant, there is a division of authority
in the cases which have been decided on this podnt of law.
However, the better reasoned cases support respondent's
contention herein.
In La Salle Extension University v. Barr, Supra, the
court, in discussing this conflict in decisions states:
"The conflict in the decisions as to whether the running of the statute of limitations is suspended in the
case of judgments by payments on account thereof,
is due to the difference of opinion as to whe1Jher a
judgment is a contract within the rule that payment
on account of a contract tolls the statute. The better
reasoned cases seem to be those holding that a judgment is not a contract.''
The court's decision in that case, as stated above, was
that a part payment on a judgment did not toll the statute.
In the case of Giordano v. Wolcott, 134 A2d 593, N.J.,
the New Jersey Court in a reoent decision (1957) affirms
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the holding. of the La Salle E,xtension University case, stating:

"Moreove:r, the result accords with the salutary policy
of suppressing the effect of matter dehors the record
purporting to extend the life of a judgment which
would appear dead to one consulting the record in the
course of a title examination. We are not persuaded
by decisions in other jurisdictions giving a different
effect to statutes they are construing."
In the case of Mutual Trust & D·eposit Company v.

Boone, 267 SW 2d 751, (Ky. 1954,) the Kentucky Supreme
Court affirmed a decision of the lower court that the statutory period of limitations on a judgment is nort extended
by the judgment debtor's promise to pay the judgment.
In that case, the corurt carefully reviewed the historical
development of the statutes of limitation and the statutory
provision for the tolling of the statute of limitations on contractual obligation by part payment o~ a new promise to
pay. The corurt concludes as follows:

"We also norte that in the Re-Statement of the Law of
Contracts, Volume I, Section 86, it is stated that a
promise to pay a debt created by contract otheT than
a judgment is binding. The exclusion ofA judgments
from the r~statement of the rule as to contracts becomes significant when it is noted that in the Re-Statement of the Law of Judgments there is no reference
to renewal of a judgment by a promise to pay.
Since we have found no Kentucky ~case which has gone
so far as to 'hold that a promise to pay a judgment
tolled the running of the statute of limitations, and
since our examination of the general authorities has
not convinced us that the Kentucky rules should be
extended, we are of the opinion that the trial judge
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properly held that a promise to pay the judgment in
this case did not extend the statutory period of limi-

tation.''
Some of the foregoing cases have analyzed in great
detail the question of whether a judgment constitutes a
contract. In addition to the analyses of these various courts,
we wish to add our own comment that a contract is ordinarily not a matter of public record, and the tolling of the
statute of limitations .as provided in 78-12-44 would appear
to.: have no significant effect except upon the parties to
the .~tract. A judgment, on the orther hand, is a pub·lic
record; not only in the county in which it is originally entered, but in any county where it might subsequently be
docketed. It becomes a lien upon all the real property of
the judgment debtor in the county where it is originally entered ·and in any subsequent county where it is docketed.
The official record of such judgment is relied upon by
members of the Bar, by abstractors and by title insurance
companies to determine whether any judgment liens on
real property are in effect. A holding that part- payments
or promises to pay have the effect of tolling the eight-year
statute of limitations would create a dilemma with respect
to the validity of titles to real property, inasmuch as events
entirely outside the official record would have a substantial
effect on the validity of a judgment lien.
It is axiomatic that a judgment is not enhanced or
made ·stronger by payment or a promise to pay. A payment or promise to pay cannot change the charactm- or
enforcealblity of the judgment. W'hy, the111, should they
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change the appUcable statute of limitations, as contended
by appellant?
But, even if we accept appellant's contention that such
chan:ge is brought about by a payment orr pro!llNse to pay,
this case is cleaTly distinguishable from the cases cited by
appeUant, because in this case the agreement, and subse~
quenrt payments, were not based on a payment of the
judgment, but of a compromise amount, presumably arrived at by negotiation between the parties. Thus, in effect, appellant abandoned the judgment in favor of a written agre,emenrt. Yet, more than eight years later, he seeks
by this action to resurrect that judgment. Ample remedies fior the enforcement of the judgment were availalble
to :him, including the filing of the ~present action prior to
September 7, 1957. He availed himself of none of those
remedies after 1951, and he should not now be allowed
to breathe new life into a dead judgment.
CONCLUSION

Respondent contends that the clear intent of the Utah
Legislature, as evidenced by the statutes in podnt, is that

an action based on a prior judgment must be commenced
within eight years from entry thereof.

There is no Utah

case authority to the contrary. The better reasoned cases
from other jurisdictions hold that the Statute of Limitations pertaining to judgments is not tolled by payments or
promises to pay.

A serious dilemma as respects titles to

real property would result if the contentions of appellant
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were upheld. Based on the facts and the law, respondent
W'ges that the decision of rthe trialeourt be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
FORD R. PAULSON, for
CHRISTENSEN, PAULSON & TAYLO'R
Attorneys faT Defendant and
Respondent
55 East Center Street
Provo, Utah
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